The Role of Law in the New Institutional Economics by Richter, Rudolf
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 26 Law & The New Institutional Economics 
2008 
The Role of Law in the New Institutional Economics 
Rudolf Richter 
Stanford Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rudolf Richter, The Role of Law in the New Institutional Economics, 26 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 13 (2008), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/3 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
The Role of Law in the New Institutional Economics 
Rudolf Richter∗ 
ABSTRACT 
To explain the role of law in the new institutional economics 
(NIE), we compare this approach with the economic analysis of law 
(EAL) of the 1970s when the NIE evolved. At that time the EAL was 
dominated by the “Chicago” or “market-based” approach that builds 
on the theory of perfect competition. Contracts are complete and 
Pareto efficient (allocative efficient). Ten years on, this approach was 
extended by informational economic models that are briefly touched 
upon here. After a few methodological considerations, the Article 
concentrates on the Williamsonian branch of NIE, i.e., the transaction 
cost approach (TCA). This theory argues that, in the real world of 
positive transaction costs, incomplete contracts can, at most, be 
efficient in a boundedly rational sense (“NIE-efficient”). The 
governance structure of contracts matters and becomes a bargaining 
point. Court ordering has to be complemented or substituted by 
private ordering. Attentive actors come to terms on a governance 
structure that protects them against ex post opportunistic maneuvers 
of their opponents. Generic governance structures are (according to 
Williamson) markets, hybrids, and hierarchies. Court ordering works 
best for market governance. In the case of hybrid modes (franchising, 
leasing, etc.), courts would mainly be supplanted by private ordering 
between the parties. As for hierarchies, courts would stay out of 
conflict resolution (fraud and conflict of interest excepted). While the 
objects of research in NIE and EAL remained different, the latter’s 
methodology appears to move closer to that of NIE. 
 
 ∗ This Article was revised during my stay at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 
fall 2006. I wish to thank Kenneth Arrow, Eirik Furubotn, Scott Kieff, Mitchell Polinsky and 
Oliver Williamson for their critical comments—and especially Kenneth Scott who advised me 
patiently on my legal presentations. Any remaining mistakes are the sole responsibility of the 
author. 
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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
To describe the role of law in NIE, it is useful to compare this 
field with its sibling, EAL. Both fields stem from early attempts to 
apply the methods of economic analysis not only to economic life 
proper but also to its institutional framework. Outstanding early 
contributors to this economic analysis of institutions are Coase, 
Alchian, Calabresi, Buchanan and Tullock, and Olson.1 What became 
known as the NIE gained momentum by the work of Williamson—
who introduced the term NIE2—and North and Thomas.3 The field of 
EAL originated at the University of Chicago Law School in its 
“Chicago approach” to legal issues.4 It was Posner (1972) who 
brought EAL—under this name—to the attention of the general legal 
academy.5  
NIE is more general than EAL regarding both its object of 
research and its methodology. The special object of EAL—at least 
during the 1970s6—is the economic analysis of legal rules under the 
assumption of perfect law enforcement.7 In contrast, the special 
object of NIE is the economic analysis of organizational design8 of a 
 
 1. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Ronald Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Armen Alchian, Some Economics of Property 
Rights, 30 IL POLITICO 816 (1965); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and 
the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
 2. The term “New Institutional Economics” is used as a generic term by different authors 
for different combinations of the above mentioned and other fields; see Rudolf Richter, The 
New Institutional Economics—Its Start, Its Meaning, Its Prospects, 6 EUR. BUS. ORGAN. L. 
REV. 161–200 (2005).  
 3. DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A 
NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973). 
 4. CENTO G. VELJANOVSKI, OXFORD CENTRE FOR SOCIO-LEGAL STUD., BIBLIOGRAPHY 
TO LAW & ECONOMICS—CONTRACT ANALYSIS (1979). 
 5. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Legal Philosophy: The Economic Analysis of 
the Law, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-econanalysis/.  
 6. What Posner calls the “second generation of economic analysts of law.” Richard A. 
Posner, A Review of Steven Shavell’s Foundations of Economic Analysis of the Law, 44 J. 
ECON. LIT. 406 (2006). 
 7. “Formal constraints” or “court orderings” work perfectly. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 46 (1990); OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 29 (1985). 
 8. Oliver E. Williamson & Edward G. Ouchi, The Market and Hierarchies Program of 
Research: Origins, Implications, Prospects, in ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 352 (William Joyce 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/3
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wider set of transactions, by assuming that legal enforcement is 
impeded or impossible. As far as their methodology is concerned, 
both EAL and NIE pay attention to positive transaction costs. 
However, while EAL—at least in its “Chicago approach”—assumes 
perfect individual rationality and perfect foresight,9 the NIE from its 
very beginnings proceeded in a more general fashion by taking 
account of the imperfections of individual rationality and limited 
foresight. In short, the NIE and EAL differ in their specific objects of 
research with the NIE applying a more general method than EAL, at 
least during those early years.  
Both fields expanded and moved on considerably during the past 
thirty years, and so a complete comparison of the two approaches 
would go beyond the scope of this Article. This Article is restricted to 
a comparison of the two fields at their common period of origin. EAL 
was the precursor, NIE followed and criticized its methodology. That 
was certainly true for the Williamson branch of NIE on which this 
Article focuses.10 Williamson extended the Coasian criticism of the 
realism of the assumptions of neoclassical microeconomics by 
questioning the efficacy of court orderings. Due to transaction costs, 
legal arrangements are generally incomplete and would have to be 
complemented or substituted by forms of “private ordering”.11 As a 
consequence, Williamsonian NIE blurs the crystal clear neoclassical 
theories of (early) EAL. Not surprisingly, Williamson was heavily 
criticized by Posner.12  
The following is an attempt to explain the role of law in NIE as 
compared with what Posner would call “second generation” EAL. 
 
& Andrew Van de Ven eds., 1991). 
 9. As understood by this author, see Richter, supra note 2, at 161–200. 
 10. That is the transaction cost approach (TCA), which considers issues of private law 
(contract law in particular) given an institutional framework; while the Northian branch of NIE, 
the new institutional economics of history, deals more with issues of law making and public law 
(changes of the institutional framework). See NORTH, supra note 7, at 230–37. For a more 
detailed description of the two branches, see Richter, supra note 2, at 161–200.  
 11. “. . . which entails self-help efforts by the immediate parties to a transaction to align 
incentives and craft governance structures that are better attuned to their exchange needs.” 
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS 43 (C. Menard & M.M. Shirley eds., 2005). 
 12. Williamson, supra note 7, questioned in Richard A. Posner, The New Institutional 
Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 73–87 
(1993). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This Article starts with an outline of the basic idea of the seemingly 
clear “Chicago” or “market-based” approach13 of the EAL which 
dominated in the 1960s and 1970s, illustrated by a legal interpretation 
of the theory of perfect competition. To better understand 
Williamson’s criticism, the Article then briefly describes the basic 
ideas of mathematical contract theory. It is an attempt to model 
efficient contracting under transaction costs that started in the 1970s 
and was soon applied by economic analysts of law.14 A few 
methodological considerations then follow. The Article concludes 
with a summary and assessment of our remarks on the role of law in 
the new institutional economics.  
II. ON THE BASIC IDEAS OF THE MARKET-BASED APPROACH TO THE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
The economic analysis of law deals with a positive and a 
normative problem: The effects of legal rules on individual behavior, 
and the social evaluation of these effects.15 As mentioned above, the 
assumed human behavior was that of perfect individual rationality, 
i.e., individuals possess consistent and stable preferences, and 
maximize their utility.16 The social evaluation of the effects of legal 
rules followed certain ideas of welfare economics. We shall first 
discuss the above-mentioned problems of EAL in the language of 
general equilibrium theory (information is perfect) and then of 
mathematical contract theory (information is imperfect).  
A. The Institutional Framework of General Equilibrium Theory 
Assume an economy consisting of a large number of perfectly 
rational individuals, each endowed with a well-defined preference 
 
 13. The latter term seems to have been introduced by Veljanovski. VELJANOVSKI, supra 
note 4. 
 14. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuck, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect 
Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404–15 (1984). 
 15. Louis Kaplow & Steven M. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1666 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 2002). 
 16. “The central claim is that the fundamental economic concepts, such as maximization, 
equilibrium, and efficiency are [understood to be] also fundamental to understanding and 
explaining the law.” ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 9 (1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/3
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order and a bundle of goods. Individuals know that by exchange they 
can improve their lot. Given zero transaction costs,17 they will 
bargain with each other until they reach a Pareto efficient exchange 
equilibrium, i.e., a state of the economy in which no one can improve 
his individual position without hurting someone else.18  
This is not the place to survey general equilibrium theory (GET). 
We content ourselves with a brief description of its assumptions and 
hypotheses to illustrate some of the basic arguments of the market-
based approach to EAL. Its attractiveness lies in its (seemingly) clear 
predictions and clear valuations of the impacts of law,19 i.e., changes 
in legal norms and judgments.  
The institutional framework of GET can be interpreted as the 
order of a private ownership economy, i.e., an economy whose 
elementary constitutional rules are based on the principle of 
inviolability of individual property rights. This demands an 
elementary legal order, plus its enforcement mechanism, regulating 
the property rights of individuals according to the general principles 
of private property and the transfer of these rights by consent, 
according to the principle of freedom of contract.20 The enforcement 
of property and contract rights is supplied by an imaginary state or 
government, which otherwise remains perfectly passive.21  
Individual property rights are embodied in GET by the assumption 
that individuals have full ownership in their endowments before and 
after trade.22 In the zero-transaction-cost world, the definition and 
 
 17. Information, bargaining, contracting, monitoring, enforcement, etc. costs. 
 18. KENNETH J. ARROW, GENERAL ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM: PURPOSE. ANANLYTIC 
TECHNIQUE, COLLECTIVE CHOICE 255 (1974). Note, however, that the concept of Pareto 
efficiency does not require general equilibrium, it is also applied to partial equilibria.  
 19. Cf. HORST EIDENMÜLLER, EFFIZIENZ ALS RECHTSPRINZIP 486 (1995).  
 20. Breaches of contracts or tortious acts are not an issue of general equilibrium theory 
(rational utility maximizers are in the zero transaction cost world by definition strictly law 
abiding people). Still, with some good will, one may use it to explain in neoclassical style the 
regulation of individual liability for contractual obligations and torts.  
 21. The classical rules demand that the state abstains from altering the personal wealth of 
its citizens and goes “not a step further than necessary to secure its citizens against themselves 
and foreign enemies; for no other final purpose should the State restrict their freedom.” 
WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT, IDEEN ZU EINEM VERSUCH, DIE GRENZEN DER WIRKSAMKEIT DES 
STAATS ZU BESTIMMEN (1792) (Phillip Reclam, Jr. ed., Reclam Publishing 1967). 
 22. That is, they have (1) the right to use up their resources physically (ius utendi), (2) the 
right to the income from them (ius fruendi), and (3) the power of management, including that of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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protection of individual property rights are problem free, and so are 
external effects. This is what was argued by Coase, on the grounds 
that unlimited bargaining for rights (including the right to do 
something which has a harmful effect, such as the creation of smoke) 
will or may lead to a Pareto efficient general equilibrium.23 In other 
words, under the assumption of zero transaction costs, Pareto 
efficiency of general equilibrium is independent of the regulation of 
legal liability for damages. 
Contractual obligations play a central role in GET. They are based 
on purchasing agreements, and consist of voluntarily assumed 
obligations, such as the obligation of the seller of a commodity to 
deliver the appropriate merchandise to the purchaser at the agreed-
upon time and location and the obligation of the buyer to pay the 
purchase price in timely fashion. GET describes both instantaneous 
as well as deferred exchange that involves the passage of time for its 
completion under otherwise given conditions. As for the latter, the 
future is involved and there are risks in the sense of the influence of 
other factors (hail, sunshine) on the contractual outcome. GET takes 
this into account by assuming that both the kinds of “other factors” 
and their statistical properties are known by everybody (e.g. hail with 
probability π = 0.01; not-hail π = 0.99)—and by extending the model 
in a manner that allows for the allocation of risk between contractual 
parties. Finally, GET can be used to describe all kinds of commercial 
contracts such as sales, lease, employment, loan, or insurance 
contracts.  
In terms of efficiency and equity—general equilibrium under 
perfect competition is Pareto efficient but not necessarily socially 
fair. A “fair” distribution may require some redistribution of income. 
Since this is an issue of public law (the tax and transfer system) 
rather than of private law, representatives of EAL argue that, 
 
alienation (ius abutendi). See F.H. LAWSON & BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 6 
(1982).  
 23. Caution is in place in accepting the proposition that unrestricted bargaining leads to 
Pareto efficiency. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1–44; The 
Analysis and Evolution of Public Expenditure: The PPB system, U.S. Joint Economic 
Committee, 91st Cong. 59–73 (1969) (statement of Kenneth J. Arrow). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/3
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“efficiency generally should be the primary criterion for evaluating 
legal rules.”24  
For illustration, we’ll have a brief look at the ingenious, though 
quite strong, assumptions of the Arrow-Debreu model, the most exact 
version of GET.25 
Commodities are characterized not only by their physical 
nature and the date and location at which they are available, 
but also by uncertain events (“states of the world”) on the 
occurrence of which their agreed upon transfer is contingent.26  
 Information of individuals is assumed to be complete in the 
sense that individuals possess “full information about the 
nature and consequences of their choice.”27 That is, consumers 
are perfectly informed about all commodities (goods and 
services) that exist at any given time and location; in addition 
they know all possible states of the world and the probability 
of their occurrence;28 and they are fully informed about all 
quoted and traded market prices.  
 Regarding individual behavior, individuals are assumed to 
act perfectly rationally in the sense that they maximize their 
individual utility, subject to their given endowments.29 Their 
individual utility functions are based on stable, well-ordered 
preferences with respect to all possible consumption plans 
(bundles of commodities), and weighted by their individual 
state preferences (their attitude towards risk).  
 
 24. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 158 (3d ed. 
2003). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 1 (2d ed. 1977); 
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 51. 
 25. GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE: AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC 
EQUILIBRIUM (1959). 
 26. Id. at 28, 98. For instance: I purchase x bushels of wheat to be delivered here, one year 
from now, payable today, on the condition that my next year’s crop has been destroyed by hail 
(i.e., the purchase of hail insurance). Individuals have full knowledge of all possible events 
(hail, drought, normal weather) and their probability distributions at each particular location etc.  
 27. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 235. 
 28. The complete commodity space of the economy. 
 29. Under this condition, since all firms are assumed to be privately owned, their 
managers have to maximize the firms’ profit subject to the firms’ production functions. 
Managers are fully informed about their technically feasible production plans. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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 Competition is perfect in the sense that there are enough 
potential buyers and sellers for each commodity that individual 
actors (households and firms) are unable to influence market 
prices.30  
 There are no frictional losses, i.e., no transaction costs. This 
is an old and well known assumption of classical economic 
theory.31 When Debreu wrote his book, the neglect of frictional 
losses was a matter of course that needn’t be mentioned.  
Given above conditions, exchange contracts are “complete”32 and, 
in general equilibrium, Pareto efficient. They consequently fulfill a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition of a socially optimal income 
or wealth distribution (Samuelson 1947, Ch. VIII). However, its legal 
and institutional economic interpretation by use of a social preference 
function would cause considerable headaches.33 The EAL literature 
avoids these and the measurement problems related with Pareto 
efficiency that is based on ordinal individual utility measures. It 
employs instead, as a concept of efficiency, the maximization of 
aggregate wealth principle34 (Kaldor-Hicks criterion35), which uses a 
cardinal utility measure, and leaves distributional issues aside. At the 
same time, EAL avoids the general equilibrium approach and makes 
do with partial equilibrium considerations. Though transaction costs 
are a recurrent theme in EAL literature, it is argued that they are 
either low enough that their impeding influence on efficiency could 
 
 30. No large (or infinite) number of buyers and sellers is needed but only “the utter 
dispersion of power. George J. Stigler, Competition, in 3 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 181–
82 (1968). 
 31. They are in particular mentioned as justification for the use of money. See John R. 
Hicks, A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money, 1 ECONOMICA 1–19 (1935).  
 32. Complete contracts (or perfect contracts) are contracts whose terms are completely 
stated and verifiable for all possible contingencies. They are strictly enforceable. COOTER & 
ULEN, supra note 16, at 230. 
 33. The question of the social welfare function—as a target function of society—would be 
both, logically (cf. Arrow’s impossibility theorem) and institutionally (cf. the theory of public 
choice and constitutional economics) a rather difficult topic to deal with. 
 34. THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS, PROPERTY, 
LITIGATION 6 (1997). Wealth is understood to be “. . . what people would pay for things (or 
demand in exchange for giving up things they possess), not what they do pay for them.” 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 16 (6th ed. 2003). 
 35. See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 405 (3d ed. 1992). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/3
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be eased by use of freely concluded standard contracts,36 or if 
transaction costs are prohibitively high the state would have to 
employ suitable methods of public control—either by court ordering 
or direct public control.37 In those cases, the government or the court 
should simulate the result of an unlimited private bargaining; that is, 
it should aim at a regulation or judgment that imitates a complete 
and, thus, an (at least bilaterally) efficient contract. “The court should 
correct an imperfect contract by restructuring its terms as the parties 
would have wanted it if the contract were perfect. Thus, the model of 
perfect contracts provides the organizing principles for the theory of 
contract enforcement.”38 
B. Institutional Perspectives of “Principal-Agent Theory”39 
Information costs are an important part of transaction costs. A 
simple way to model them is to assume that information costs are 
either zero or indefinitely high—as assumed in principal-agent 
theory. Principal-agent theory deals with bilateral exchange. One 
actor, the “principal,” makes a take it or leave it offer; his opponent—
the “agent”—accepts or rejects. Both are fully informed except the 
principal—who has a complete “blind spot” toward his (potential) 
agent. For example, the principal is unable to observe: (1) before 
contract conclusion his potential agent’s (e.g., his job applicants’) 
quality40; or (2) after contract conclusion, his agent’s effort level.41  
However, to enable the principal to calculate his constrained 
individual utility maximum, the model builder gave him some extra 
pieces of information that he didn’t have (or needed to have) in GET. 
Examples of this follow. 
For case (1): The principal now knows his applicants’ quality 
distribution (say, the numbers of high and low quality job applicants). 
 
 36. POSNER, supra note 24, at 69, 292. 
 37. Id. at 271. “The EAL commits the state to ensure the establishment of efficient 
methods of public control where the transaction costs of private negotiations would be 
prohibitively high.” EIDENMÜLLER, supra note 19, at 95 (own translation).  
 38. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 233. 
 39. As an example of informational economics, see Stiglitz, infra note 54. 
 40. A case of “adverse selection.”  
 41. A “moral hazard” case. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As a consequence, the principal is able to avoid an “adverse 
selection” among applicants by calculating a menu of contracts that 
brings the individual applicant42 to reveal his quality and, at the same 
time, helps to realize a second-best utility optimum for the principal.  
For case (2): The principal knows, in addition to his agent’s 
reservation price, his agent’s utility function. Thus, he can calculate 
how his prospective agent will react to his offer. Given this 
information, the principal is able to offer his agent a compensation 
scheme that makes the agent to maximize the principal’s utility 
together with his own. In case of uncertain results, the principal 
obtains a second-best optimum.  
In both cases, no bargaining is allowed—only a take it or leave it 
offer by the principal. Efficiency measure is in both cases the 
maximization of aggregate wealth principle.43  
The assumed institutional framework and individual behavior of 
actors are the same as in GET: The elementary legal order of a 
private ownership economy, a state that is strong enough to enforce 
this legal order, perfectly rational acting individuals, and zero 
transaction costs—apart from the assumed specific “blind spot” of 
the principal. Agency contracts are complete and perfectly 
enforceable by the courts at no cost. As Williamson puts it: “The 
future . . . holds no surprises; all of the relevant contracting action is 
packed into ex ante incentive alignments.”44 It is this lack of realism 
in the assumptions of GET and principal-agent theory that gave rise 
to Williamsonian NIE.  
III. AN INTERJECTION ON METHODOLOGY 
In his famous article on “The Methodology of Positive 
Economics” Friedman argues against “the belief that a theory can be 
 
 42. Under certain further conditions. 
 43. Cf., for instance, the description in FURUBOTN AND RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND 
ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 218 (2d ed. 
2005). 
 44. WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 27. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/3
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tested by the realism of its assumptions independently of the accuracy 
of its predictions . . . .”45 Instead: 
the relevant question to ask about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory 
is not whether they are descriptively ‘realistic,’ for they never 
are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for 
the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only 
by seeing whether the theory works, which means whether it 
yields sufficiently accurate predictions.46  
For these reasons, Friedman prefers Marshall’s pure theory of 
perfect competition and pure monopoly to Chamberlin’s or 
Robinson’s theory of monopolistic or imperfect competition. He 
concedes, however, that his rejection of Chamberlin’s and 
Robinson’s criticism of GET does not imply that GET deserves any 
high degree of confidence. Any theory would be necessarily 
provisional and subject to change with the advance of knowledge.47 
Friedman admits that:  
[p]rogress in positive economics will require not only testing 
and elaborating of existing hypotheses but also the 
construction of new hypotheses. On this problem there is little 
to say on a formal level. The construction of a hypothesis is a 
creative act of inspiration, intuition; its essence is the vision of 
something new in familiar material.48  
It would be highly desirable to have a more general theory than 
Marshall’s hypothesis of atomistically competitive firms, grouped 
into industries, and monopolies. Such a general theory would “enable 
us to handle problems we now cannot . . . .” However, “[t]o perform 
this function, the more general theory must have content and 
 
 45. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 41 (1953). Friedman refers to 
the theories of monopolistic and imperfect competition which were explicitly motivated by the 
argument that the assumptions of “perfect competition” or “perfect monopoly” are a false image 
of reality. Id.  
 46. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 47. Id. at 41. 
 48. Id. at 42. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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substance; it must have implications susceptible to empirical 
contradiction and of substantive interest and importance.”49 
The theory of imperfect or monopolistic competition, 
unfortunately, would possess none of the attributes that would make 
it a truly useful general theory.50 “Its contribution has been limited 
largely to improving the exposition of the economics of the 
individual firm and thereby the derivation of implications of the 
Marshallian model, refining Marshall’s monopoly analysis, and 
enriching the vocabulary available for describing industrial 
experience.”51 
Friedman concludes: “The theory of monopolistic competition 
offers no tools for the analysis of an industry and so no stopping 
place between the firm at one extreme and general equilibrium at the 
other.”52  
Would principal-agent theory meet Friedman’s attributes of a 
truly useful general theory? Does it have content and substance? Are 
its implications susceptible to empirical contradiction and of 
substantive interest and importance?53 Stiglitz understood 
informational economics (of which principal-agent theory is a special 
case) to be a more promising approach to economic life than GET.54 
It certainly helped to rationalize actual business relationships like 
sharing contracts. But, as for its predictive power, doubts may be in 
place. As Hart and Holmström admit, “the extreme sensitivity to 
informational variables that comes across from this type of modeling 
is at odds with reality. Real-world schemes are simpler than the 
theory would dictate and surprisingly uniform across a wide range of 
circumstances . . . .”55 We won’t discuss this question here any 
further. In this Article, we are interested in the question: Does 
 
 49. Id. at 38. 
 50. Id.; see also GEORGE J. STIGLER, PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION THEORIES 311 
(1968). 
 51. FRIEDMAN, supra note 45, at 38. 
 52. Id. at 39. 
 53. This author was no more able to ask Milton Friedman himself while he was at the 
Hoover Institution during fall 2007. 
 54. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective, 95 ECON. J. 
21–41 (1985). 
 55. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN 
ECONOMIC THEORY ch. 3 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/3
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Williamsonian NIE—the methodology of his TCA—meet 
Friedman’s demanding criteria? To answer this question we’ll first 
have a brief look at Williamson’s TCA.  
IV. WILLIAMSON’S TRANSACTION COST APPROACH: ITS CLAIMS 
AND ITS ANALYTICAL CORE 
A. Williamson 
Williamson claims that his transaction cost approach offers a more 
general theory of contracts than market based EAL. The latter’s view 
of contracting would suggest “that commercial transactions are 
greatly dependent on and governed by legal forms and rules, while 
TCA addresses itself to a wider set of transactions.”56  
The absence of frictions (zero transaction costs) would certainly 
provide a useful standard, but there would remain numerous 
circumstances  
where the departure from ideal conditions is sufficient to 
warrant sacrificing the frictionless assumption when studying 
actual phenomena. Milton Friedman’s (1953, 16–19) example 
of estimating the velocity of falling bodies by a simple formula 
(s = ½ gt2 ) is illustrative. Whether this ‘oversimplifies’ or is 
quite adequate depends principally on what is being dropped 
(e.g., a steel ball or a feather), how close to a perfect vacuum 
has been attained and the precision of measurement required.57 
Williamson answers Friedman’s demanding criteria by, first, 
requiring that TCA has to be able to determine when the concept of 
“complete contract”58 applies and “when it needs to be augmented by 
a richer conception of [imperfect] contract.” Second, regarding the 
empirical support of the TCA, he requires that “[t]he critical 
transaction cost dimensions for describing transactions need to be 
 
 56. Oliver E. Williamson, Contract Analysis: The Transaction Cost Approach, in THE 
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW, at 40, 42 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981). 
 57. Williamson, supra note 56, at 55–60. 
 58. Williamson uses instead the term “discrete transaction paradigm.” 
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identified, and the resulting mix of transactions needs to be matched 
with governance structures in a discriminating (economizing) way.”59 
How does Williamson fulfill these two claims? We’ll try to couch 
our answer in an outline of the analytical core of his transaction cost 
approach. 
B. The Analytical Core of Williamson’s Transaction Cost Approach  
EAL, as explored in this Article,60 distinguishes between private 
contracting under conditions of low transaction costs with 
coordination of individual plans by complete contracts, and public 
intervention or court ordering if the transaction costs of private 
contracting are prohibitively high, with nothing in between. 
Williamson’s TCA, on the other hand, questions court orderings or 
state interventions as the only means to protect one’s contractual 
agreements against an opportunistic opening of renegotiations by the 
other side.61 TCA concentrates, therefore, on various means of 
private ordering.62 The two extreme poles of TCA are, accordingly, 
low transaction costs (Williamson’s “market” case) and prohibitively 
high transaction costs (coordination through privately agreed upon 
hierarchical “governance structures” like corporations—Williamson’s 
“hierarchy” case). The zone between the two poles is filled by 
“hybrid modes of contracting”63 as represented by various types of 
“governance structures”64 of incomplete private contracts.65 Thus, the 
 
 59. Id. at 57. 
 60. That is, as it was widely understood during the period of time when Williamson 
developed his TCA. 
 61. As Crocker and Masten explain: “As a number of legal and economic scholars have 
emphasized, contracts are not the precise, mechanically enforced documents often encountered 
in economic theory. Indeed, contracts are extremely imperfect tools for controlling 
opportunism.” Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Pretia Ex Machina? Prices and Process in 
Long-Term Contracts, 34 J.L. & ECON. 69–99 (1991). 
 62. But also public regulation as in the case of private purchases of a natural monopoly. 
See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—in General and 
with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73–104 (1976). 
 63. Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269 (1991), reprinted in OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
THE MECHANISM OF GOVERNANCE 96 (1996). 
 64. Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail 
Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 265 (1984); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost 
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233–61 (1979). 
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concept of “governance structure” or “organizational design” is not 
only used for the control of individual activities within hierarchies 
but also within incomplete contracts. Consequently, Williamson 
occasionally calls his approach the “new economics of 
organization.”66 
However, neither EAL nor TCA offers a quantitative measure of 
transaction costs to facilitate empirical verification or refutation. Yet 
Williamson applies two qualitative criteria as a substitute measure for 
transaction cost levels: frequency of transactions, and transaction 
specific investments.67  
Interestingly, neither Coase, North, nor Williamson completely 
negate neoclassical microeconomics.68 They criticize the general 
assumptions of individual rationality, perfect information, and zero 
transaction costs.69 Their general assumptions are bounded 
rationality, imperfect information (including uncertainty in the sense 
of not knowing what the future will bring–hail, rain, sunshine?70) and 
positive transaction costs.71 If honesty is not considered to be an 
inherent personality trait (and it is not), opportunistic behavior has to 
be expected. In fact, it is part of the central assumptions of 
Williamsonian NIE.72 As a consequence, the time after contract 
 
According to Palay, the term governance (first used by Williamson) is in the contractual context 
a shorthand expression “. . . for the institutional framework in which contracts are initiated, 
negotiated, monitored, adapted, enforced, and terminated.” Id.  
 65. Williamson avoids the term “incomplete contracts" in this context. Instead, he speaks 
of “a richer conception of contract” than the “market-based paradigm.” Williamson, supra note 
56, at 57. 
 66. Oliver E. Williamson, The Evolving Science of Organization, J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 38 (1993). 
 67. To offer a predictive theory of contract the “critical transaction cost dimensions for 
describing transactions need to be identified, and the resulting mix of transactions needs to be 
matched with governance structures in a discriminating (economizing) way.” Williamson, 
supra note 56, at 57. 
 68. North even writes: “To abandon neoclassical theory is to abandon economics as a 
science.” Douglass C. North, Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History, 16 J. 
ECON. LIT. 974 (1978). It may be questioned whether he is still of this opinion. 
 69. At least in their earlier writings. 
 70. Actors don’t know all possible contingencies. Valid probabilities cannot be calculated 
in such a context. On this problem see, e.g., Jack Wiseman, The Black Box, 101 ECON. J. 151–
55 (1991). 
 71. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 66, at 104. 
 72. Id. As in the trust-abuse game, a person is assumed to be honest only if it is more 
advantageous to him than being unreliable. Cf. Lawrence G. Tesler, A Theory of Self-Enforcing 
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conclusion may cause “troublesome” problems in the world of NIE. 
Contract conclusion may lead to what Williamson calls the 
Fundamental Transformation: Because of transaction specific 
investments, the contractual parties may find themselves locked into 
a bilateral monopoly situation.73 Due to their bounded individual 
rationality, the existence of transaction costs and imperfect foresight, 
the parties are unable to write a strictly enforceable complete 
contract.74 As a consequence, opportunistic behavior of the other side 
becomes a problem.75 
Preventing ex post opportunistic behavior is difficult if not 
impossible.76 Due to information and transaction costs, it is 
expensive, or even impossible, to verify one’s case to a third party 
such as a court. Court orderings may need to be supplemented or 
substituted by private orderings if the parties wish to effectively 
protect themselves against ex post opportunism of their trading 
partners. “An important element in designing contracts becomes 
economizing on the costs associated with resolving disputes and 
governing exchange.”77 Williamson distinguishes in this context 
between three generic forms of governance, which differ also in 
contract law terms: markets, hybrids,78 and hierarchies.79  
 
Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27–44 (1980). 
 73. Williamson, supra note 66, at 104. Williamson writes: “The Fundamental 
Transformation explains why the problem of bilateral dependence—previously treated as a very 
special condition of pre-existing bilateral monopoly—is actually a very widespread and 
troublesome condition. . . . The discovery and explication of the Fundamental Transformation is 
very much a transaction cost economics exercise.” Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 74. One that details all possible future contingencies. 
 75. More detailed examples of opportunistic tactics of contractors “. . . to effect a 
redistribution of the gains from trade include capitalizing on ambiguous terms, suing for trivial 
deviations, making false claims of dissatisfaction, withholding relevant information, interfering 
with or failing to cooperate in the other party’s performance, and failing to mitigate damages 
where a breach has occurred.” Crocker & Masten, supra note 61, at 72 n.6. 
 76. “The courts (at least in the United States) will not enforce a “no renegotiation” clause 
in a contract . . .” JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FOR 
PERFORMANCE AND GROWTH 86 (2006).  
 77. Crocker & Masten, supra note 61, at 70. 
 78. Williamson, supra note 63, at 96. 
 79. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISM OF GOVERNANCE 101 (1996). Which one 
is chosen depends among others on its involved degree of asset specificity and level of 
transaction costs (its governance costs). Id. at 105. 
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Empirical examples of contractual governance structures to limit 
opportunist renegotiations are described for long-term contractual 
relationships with highly idiosyncratic investments by the parties, for 
cases of vertical integration and instances of franchise bidding for 
public monopolies.80 They support the hypothesis that, depending on 
circumstances, the governance structures of incomplete contracts can 
be seen as “efficient” adaptations—with “efficient” not being 
understood as Pareto efficiency. Efficiency in this sense “is not that 
of replicating ideal market results, but procedural efficiency in 
adjusting to an uncertain and changing environment.”81 North speaks 
of “adaptive efficiency”.82 Certainly, given the basic assumptions of 
NIE, attempts at adjustment may well bring about improvements but 
they are not the same as “efficiency” in the sense of optimal 
procedural or adaptive means.83 It seems therefore better to avoid the 
term “efficiency” altogether. Following Herbert Simon’s replacement 
of “maximization” by “satisficing,”84 we substitute the word 
“efficiency” by a boundedly rational version of it. For want of a 
better term, we’ll speak of “NIE-efficiency.”85  
To sum up, transaction cost economics demonstrates that, in the 
real world of positive transaction costs and under certain 
 
 80. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS VOL. II: POLICY AND APPLICATIONS (Oliver E. 
Williamson & Scott E. Masten eds., 1995). For more complete overviews of the empirical work 
on transaction cost economics, see Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research 
in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assesment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335–61 
(1995); CHRISTOPHER S. BOERNER & JEFFREY T. MACHER, TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS: 
AN ASSESSMENT ON EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2002). 
 81. Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski, Introduction: The Economic Approach to Law, 
in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW, 24 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981). 
 82. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 80 (1990). 
 83. Optimality could at most be determined in very simple decision problems, where 
everything relevant can be known and computation and deliberation are virtually costless. Gerd 
Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 40–
50 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2001). 
 84. HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198–205 (1957). 
 85. An alternative may be to use Williamson’s term “remediable.” WILLIAMSON, supra 
note 79, at 379. He understands, however, the term in an objectively profitable sense and writes: 
“A condition is held to be remediable if a superior feasible alternative can be described and 
implemented with net gains.” At another place he remarks, the NIE “. . . eschews hypothetical 
ideals and insists that the relevant comparisons are with feasible alternatives, all of which are 
flawed.” Id. at 7 (quoting Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries: Discussion, 54 AM. 
ECON. R. 194–97 (1964)). See also Furubotn & Richter, supra note 43, at 119. 
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circumstances, incomplete contracts (in the sense of EAL as 
understood here) may be NIE-efficient. Legal enforcement and self 
enforcement complement each other with the aim “to design 
workable order-preserving mechanisms for adapting to 
disturbances.”86 Court or public ordering, as in cases of public 
regulation, and private ordering characterize the governance structure 
or organizational design of contractual relationships. Attentive actors 
agree before they come to terms on a governance structure that they 
regard suitable.  
V. DOES WILLIAMSONIAN NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS MEET 
FRIEDMAN’S DEMANDING CRITERIA? 
The two questions to be answered are: (1) Does it have “content 
and substance”? and (2) Are its “implications susceptible to empirical 
contradiction and of substantive interest and importance”? 87 
On the first question, Posner raised serious doubts.88 Scott 
summarizes Posner’s remarks as follows:  
Posner seems to suggest that the contributions of the 
Williamson camp may lie more in terminology than in 
substance. Does bounded rationality lead us in a different 
direction than the recognition of information costs? Do asset 
specificity and opportunism create different problems than 
those considered under the heading of bilateral monopoly?89 
Is Posner’s assessment of Williamson’s TCA correct? Scott has 
his doubts about it and so does this author. Scott argues: 
The traditional bilateral monopoly literature is concerned to 
find the optimal terms of trade between a single buyer and a 
single seller; there is no particular interest in how they arrived 
in that position of mutual uniqueness. Asset specificity is 
 
 86.  Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3 
(2005). 
 87. FRIEDMAN, supra note 45, at 38. 
 88. Richard A. Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149 
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 73–87, 84–87, 120 (1993). 
 89. Kenneth E. Scott, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 93 (1993) (summarizing Posner 1993, supra note 88). 
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interested in precisely that latter question: what creates 
relationships of bilateral monopoly? One of the answers is a 
significant degree of loss of value if the physical or human 
capital in question has to be shifted to a new use—a distinctly 
different issue.90 
Scott extends his argument by asking: Did Williamson’s treatment 
of bilateral-monopoly-type questions draw attention to them and 
carry them further? His answer is “decidedly in the affirmative”:  
Posner, for example, has stressed the high transaction costs 
(and lost opportunities for gain) often associated with strategic 
bargaining in bilateral monopoly situations, and the role of 
legal rules in avoiding them. But Williamson adds emphasis on 
the wide array of contractual and governance devices invented 
by the parties who foresee vulnerability to expropriation of 
whatever quasi-rents are embedded in their initial deal.91 
Thus, Williamson’s new approach to contract theory appears to 
meet Friedman’s requirement of “content and substance,” an 
impression underlined by the fact that Williamson’s transaction cost 
approach opened up various new analytical fields such as the theory 
of incomplete contracts started by Grossman and Hart.92 
Williamson’s concept of private ordering was extended by techniques 
of self enforcement such as leaving hostages, providing collateral, or 
the strategy of “tit-for-tat.”93 His concept of the Fundamental 
Transformation is widely used in other fields. For example, in 
 
 90. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 91. Id. (emphasis added). 
 92. Further developed, i.e., by Holmstrom and Tirol (1991), Bernheim and Whinston 
(1998) and Bajari and Tadelis (2001). Leading German representatives of this approach are 
Nöldecke and Schmidt (1995), both from the Bonn school. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver.D. 
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. 
POL. ECON. 691–719 (1986); Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, Transfer Pricing and 
Organizational Form, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 201–28 (1991); B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael 
Winston, Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion, 16 RAND J. ECON. 
269–81 (1985); Patrick Bajari & Steven Tadelis, Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A 
Theory of Procurement Contracts, 32 RAND J. ECON. 381–407 (2001); Georg Nöldecke & 
Klaus M. Schmidt, Sequential Investments in Options to Own, 29 RAND J. ECON. 633–53 
(1995); URS SCHWEIZER, VERTRAGSTHEORIE (1999). 
 93. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law in the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5–32 
(1985); ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
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political science it became a central hypothesis of the theory of 
international regimes, which are legally unenforceable because of the 
sovereignty of the states. Following TCA, they are interpreted as 
relational, self-enforcing contracts, which help to organize 
relationships in mutually beneficial ways. “The rules are changed, 
bent or broken to meet their exigencies of the moment. . . . They are 
often matters of negotiation and renegotiation.”94 
On the above second question, statements that are “susceptible to 
empirical contradiction”, as Friedman demands, require that the 
variables of claimed causal relationships are measurable. The 
independent and dependent variables of Williamson’s transaction 
cost economics are not only in principle but also in fact (roughly95) 
measurable.96 Independent variables are his three “critical 
dimensions”: uncertainty, the frequency with which transactions 
recur, and the degree to which investments are idiosyncratic.97 
Dependent variables are a series of governance structures: from 
“pure, anonymous spot markets” to fully integrated firms or 
hierarchies, with diverse hybrid modes in between.98 Williamson 
assumes that, given the critical dimensions, the contractual parties 
choose with certainty a particular, ideally NIE-efficient, governance 
structure.99 His assumed relationship between critical dimension and 
governance structure is not expressed by a mathematical function but 
rather by an ideal typical relationship. Such relationships are also 
(roughly) measurable as illustrated by other fields such as medical 
science. 
Thus Williamson’s transaction cost economics appears to be 
“susceptible to empirical contradiction.” In fact, as Shelanski and 
 
 94. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 28 J.L. & ECON. 89 (1984). 
 95. See supra note 68. 
 96. C. H. COOMBS, R. L. DAVIS & ROBERT MCDOWELL THRALL, DECISION PROCESSES 
24 (1954). 
 97. Williamson, supra note 56, at 49. 
 98. WILLIAMSON, supra note 79, at 107.  “. . . the hybrid mode is located between market 
and hierarchy with respect to incentives, adaptability, and bureaucratic costs, . . .” Examples are 
complex contracts or partial ownership arrangements. 
 99. Oliver E. Williamson, Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization, 23 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 75, 79 (1991). As Williamson puts it: TCA is an effort to “align 
transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in their 
costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost minimizing) way.”  
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Klein have shown, it is supported by a large number of empirical 
studies covering a broad range of phenomena.100 That transaction cost 
economics is also of “substantive interest and importance” as 
reflected by the positive echo Williamson’s approach received in the 
economic literature and beyond.101 
VI. THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS  
In this Article we compared Williamsonian New Institutional 
Economics with the early version of Economic Analysis of Law of 
contractual relationships. While the latter deals with contract in the 
legal sense of the term—understood in accordance to the law of the 
land—Williamson uses the term contract in everyday language that 
includes non-legal relationships. As for contracts in the legal sense, 
Williamson emphasizes the role of “relational contracts,”102 which he 
lists, together with firms and markets, in the subtitle of his book The 
Economic Institutions of Capitalism.103 Williamson argues that 
efficient organizational structures depend on and are governed by 
more than legal rules: “informal procedures and non-market 
organization also perform important functions.”104 Furthermore, since 
there are limits to the force of law, court ordering would have to be 
supplemented or substituted by private ordering, which is needed to 
safeguard one’s transaction-specific investments against ex post 
opportunistic maneuvers of the other side. Finally, unforeseen events 
and disturbances play a major role in social life, wherefore 
 
 100. Shelanski & Klein, supra note 80, at 338–61. They point out:  
The empirical work in transaction cost economics uses a variety of econometric and 
historical methods. . . qualitative case studies, quantitative case studies, and cross-
sectional econometric analyses. . . . The bulk of the empirical literature . . . consists of 
case analyses of various kinds . . . because the main variables of interest—asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency—are difficult to measure consistently across 
firms and industries. 
Id. See also Boerner & Macher, supra note 80.  
 101. Though not necessarily in the sociological literature. Rudolf Richter, New Economic 
Sociology and New Institutional Economics (Annual Conference of the International Society for 
New Institutional Economics, paper presented Sept. 13–15, 2001), available at http://www.uni-
saarland.de/fak1/fr12/richter/institut/revise4.pdf. 
 102. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1978 (1974). 
 103. WILLIAMSON, supra note 7. 
 104. Williamson, supra note 56, at 42. 
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organizational arrangements have to “aim at workable order-
preserving mechanisms for adapting to disturbances.”105 Pareto 
efficiency (including Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) of neoclassical 
economics becomes obsolete. It has to be substituted by a different 
concept of efficiency that allows for adaptability to the unforeseen 
and limited rationality of actors; we called it “NIE-efficiency”. In this 
sense, imperfect contracts may be limited-rationally efficient 
provided the contractual parties chose a NIE-efficient governance 
structure or organization of their relationship. It is important to see 
that, different from GET and agency theory, the bargaining object of 
Williamsonian NIE is much wider. It includes the choice of the 
contractual form and its organizational design. The “immediate 
parties to an exchange are actively involved in the provision of good 
order and workable arrangements.”106 They will bargain with each 
other until they have reached an NIE-efficient exchange equilibrium 
inclusive of its governance structure.107 If the parties are unable to 
resolve their differences themselves and use the courts for “ultimate 
appeal” they can only hope that courts interpret their contracts “as if 
they had spent the time and effort to specify more detailed terms.”108 
Courts can at most try to resolve ambiguities of incomplete contracts; 
they cannot replace their basic governance structure by one they 
consider might be more efficient. As mentioned above, Williamson 
distinguishes between three generic forms of governance: markets, 
hybrids and hierarchies. Court ordering works best for market 
governance. In the case of hybrid modes, courts would be mainly 
supplanted by private ordering between the parties. As for 
hierarchies, courts would stay out of conflict resolution, with 
exceptions for fraud and conflict of interest.  
 
 105. Williamson, supra note 86. 
 106. Id. at 2. 
 107. Probably for this reason, Williamson calls his approach also the “economics of 
governance.” Id.  
 108. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 301 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/3
p 13 Richter book pages.doc  8/26/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Law in the NIE 35 
 
 
VII. AFTERWORD109 
The Chicago or market based approach of EAL dominated the 
scene in the 1960s and 1970s when Williamson developed his 
transaction cost approach. Today, “practitioners of law and 
economics no longer sing in a single voice.” 110 That seems to be true 
even at the University of Chicago Law School. Thus, while Posner 
defends, unchanged, the assumption of perfect rationality,111 Epstein 
agrees “heartily” with Gigerenzer who promotes “the view of 
bounded rationality as the way real people make the majority of their 
inferences and decisions.”112 Contracting costs are increasingly taken 
note of113; contractual holdups such as renegotiations under duress, 
which are the basic problem of Williamson’s transaction cost 
economics, found their way into modern EAL literature. A newer 
“incomplete contract” literature evolves, which takes as its task “the 
design of efficient alternatives that do not require completely 
specified contracts.”114 Craswell discusses legal aspects of 
characteristic problems of Williamsonian NIE: the imperfections of 
courts, legal problems of renegotiations, and problems of efficient 
precautions. Shavell examines the theory and practice of legal 
interventions in contracts to prevent holdups.115 Scott discusses the 
anticipation of prospects of renegotiations being built into contractual 
design.116 Shavell also models the problem of interpretation of 
 
 109. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995). In the later 
EAL literature, legal interventions in case of contractual holdups are discussed with an eye on 
(mathematical) economic theory of contracts as described by Hart (1995); See, e.g., Steven 
Shavell, Contracts, Holdup, and Legal Intervention (Harvard Law School Discussion Paper, 
Mar., 2005); Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpreting of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 289–314 (2006).  
 110. Ejan Mackaay, History of Law and Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Garrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
 111. POSNER, supra note 34, at 18–21. 
 112. Richard A. Epstein, The Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, in HEURISTICS AND THE 
LAW 142 (Charles Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer eds., 2006). 
 113. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly 
Contracting, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2–31 (2004); Shavell (2006), supra note 109. 
 114. Richard Craswell, The Incomplete Contracts Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151–68 (2005). 
 115. Shavell (2005), supra note 109. 
 116. Robert E. Scott, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 187–201 (2005). This is similar to Williamson’s claim that “ex post support 
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incomplete contracts and mentions a number of articles that 
addressed or touched upon that topic earlier.117 Thus, newer literature 
on EAL is developing that takes up core issues of Williamson’s 
TCA—without going back to his work, but starting directly from the 
much narrower approach of the mathematical theory of incomplete 
contracts that developed from TCA.118  
Of course, regarding its object of research, EAL goes on to 
analyze legal issues, while the NIE sticks to its general problem of 
organizational design—a field of research that has grown far beyond 
Williamsonian NIE.119 Of interest in this connection is the remark by 
Posner that in the task of feasible judicial reform, “the literature in 
organizational economics, as yet neglected by economic analysts of 
law, has an important role to play.”120 
 
institutions of contract matter” WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 29. 
 117. Shavell (2006), supra note 109, at 293. 
 118. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 116; Shavell (2005), supra note 109; Craswell, supra note 
114.  
 119. For a review, see ROBERTS, supra note 76. 
 120. Posner, supra note 6, at 413. 
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